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framework with the EU, and a 'soft Brexit', which means that the UK will keep access to the internal market. As the Government is silent on the form, or even sometimes giving contradictory indications as to what it wants from these negotiations, it has led to this somewhat extraordinary and even chaotic situation, where it is difficult to give any accurate statements as regards the key question 'what does Brexit mean? Against this background, there is still an on-going discussion as to the different options available for the UK. Article 50 TEU, while it gives a certain purpose and the procedural framework, it leaves gaps which now need to be filled. The first question for the UK was how to trigger Article 50 TEU, i.e. notify its EU partners that it wants to initiate the withdrawal procedure. This is an issue where neither the EU law nor the UK constitutional law prescribed an obvious answer. Another question for the UK, as well as the remaining EU Member States, relates to the possible agreement on a new relationship.
Article 50 TEU in a Glance: What Is Clear and Not So Clear
For the purpose of our analysis, it is beneficial to reproduce here the full text of Article 50 TEU:
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
A Member
State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Council are decided by the national laws, in the same way as it is for the national law of the acceding state to determine the process of accepting accession to the EU.
There is a central omission in the structure of Article 50 too. It fails to mention whether a withdrawing Member State may un-trigger the process during the withdrawal negotiations. It was discussed before the Supreme Court rendered its judgment, whether this question should be referred to the CJEU, in order to determine what is the effect for the UK for notifying the EU that it wants to start the 8 By way of derogation from point (a), where the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States. This means in practice 20 Member States.
The United Kingdom Constitutional Landscape: Royal Prerogative and Parliamentary

Sovereignty
One of the most complex issues during the fall 2016 has been what is the correct constitutional procedure for the UK Government to trigger Article 50 TEU to start the UK-EU negotiations. As stated above, this falls for the national law to decide. However, the problem here is that neither the UK constitutional law nor the 2015 EU Referendum Act set out clearly the procedure for notification.
The EU Referendum Act of 2015 did not give binding status for the EU referendum and provided simply that the referendum result is advisory. The question therefore arose whether the decision to notify the EU under Article 50 TEU can be simply approved by a royal prerogative, or if it needs to be submitted to a parliamentary approval, in other words that a debate and vote by both houses of the Parliament would need to take place. Thus the debate concerned the role and powers of the executive (Government) and the legislature (Parliament).
The Government argued forcefully that it has royal prerogative to trigger Article 50 in the EU. The royal prerogative is often used for matters relating to international affairs, but it was questioned, whether there are constitutional restraints based on the very core of the concepts of the Parliamentary sovereignty and even the rule of law. In consequence, several court proceedings were raised to protect the parliamentary involvement (e.g. cases Gina Miller or Mischon de Reva on behalf of its clients).
One of the main claimants, Gina Miller, stated that the courts should uphold that the referendum was merely consultative and the democratically elected Parliament should decide whether to trigger the Article 50 procedure or not. The Government's reasoning for the use of royal prerogative was published in response to the national court proceedings.
11 The Government's main claim rested on two factors: first, the notification under Referendum Act was passed against a background including a clear briefing paper to parliamentarians explaining that the referendum would have advisory effect only.
17
The interpretation of the royal prerogative seemed to be a highly controversial issue, with the Belfast High Court arriving to a different opinion also in November. The Belfast High Court stated that neither the UK Parliament in London, nor the Northern Ireland Assembly, had to be asked for their consent before the UK government triggers the Article 50 procedure. 18 The High Court in London took it for granted that once the Article 50 procedure is triggered, it cannot be stopped, whereas the High court in Belfast did not agree on this, holding the UK announcement as revocable. It further found that the decision to notify the EU of the intention to leave under Article 50 does not itself generate changes in law. Therefore, the UK's Supreme Court faced a dilemma, which interpretation of the royal prerogative and Article 50 procedure it prefers.
The Government appealed the London High Court decision to the UK Supreme Court. In December 2016 the case was heard by the Supreme Court and it delivered its ruling in 24 January 2017. 19 As regards the prerogative powers the Supreme Court confirmed by a strong majority of 8 to 3 that the UK government cannot trigger Article 50 procedure without an authorizing Act of Parliament. The prerogative powers may not extend to acts which result in a change to UK domestic law.
Consequently, the Government must seek for an Act of Parliament before triggering Article 50, since it is obvious that withdrawal from the EU treaties would change domestic law, which in turn would remove some existing domestic rights of UK residents.
17 Ibid, para. 107. The Court stated: "Moreover, Parliament must have appreciated that the referendum was intended only to be advisory as the result of a vote in the referendum in favour of leaving the European Union would inevitably leave for future decision many important questions relating to the legal implementation of withdrawal from the European Union". 18 The claimant Mr McCord claimed that the Brexit could undermine a 1998 peace deal, reinstate a hard border with the Republic of Ireland and cut EU cross-community funding. Irrespective of all this the High Court found that the 1998 Northern Ireland Act created no substantive legitimate expectation that its people will be consulted on before withdrawing from the EU. 
Comments on Devolution
It was argued also in the Supreme Court case that Brexit will have impact on the UK regional arrangements and thus on the devolved powers. This is the case in particular about the devolution in After the Supreme Court ruling it looks like there will be two different Bills from the Government:
The Bill authorising the Government to trigger Article 50 and the "Great Repeal Bill". The first Bill is simply asking the authority from the Parliament to trigger Article 50 procedure and start the negotiations for the UK to leave the EU. This would comply with the Supreme Court judgment as the Court did not request the Government to set out its negotiation objectives in the Bill. The Government published already within two days after the ruling a simple Bill, in which the Parliament is asked to
give the Prime Minister the authority to issue notice of the UK's intent to withdraw from the EU.
29
This Bill is already on its way through the Parliament. The Commons had the first vote on it on 1 February, where the overwhelming majority voted in favour.
30
The Government will also introduce a "Great Repeal Bill" in Queen's speech in May. The purpose of this bill is to transpose all the current EU law into domestic UK law, in order to avoid a sudden legal vacuums as the UK exits from the EU legal framework. 31 This Bill may potentially present many challenges, in particular it does not provide for sufficient answer where there are mutual cooperation frameworks between the UK and the EU. 32 However, these challenges are outside the scope of this paper and to be considered in a later time when it will be more clear what the Government aims to present.
However, the referendum and these Bills set out only the basic position that the UK should withdraw from the EU, but not how or on what conditions. Given the Supreme Court decision, one can hardly 29 The bill was published in 26 January 2017 and it's aim is to "confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the EU". Granting this power to the Prime Minister would have effect "despite any provision made by or under the European Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment". This important bill has granted only 5 days of time in the House of Commons. 30 There were 498 votes in favour and 114 against. 31 There is quite some concern that the Bill would introduce the power for the Government to change EU law obligations through statutory instruments. While the Government argues that this kind of flexibility is needed, as the EU law governs very wide areas of law, there are some concerns that this would end with a great power transfer in favour of executive, see for example Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, "The Great agreement is not ready once the UK ceases to be an EU State, they may be need to put a transitional agreement in place.
One source of the complications here is Article 50 TEU. Article 50 sets out a separate ratification mechanism only for the withdrawal. The withdrawal agreement ("the divorce settlement") is to be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) TFEU and based on Article 50 (2) TEU. Article 50 is more vague about the new arrangements, it only provides that the withdrawal process may take account of the framework of the new relationship of the withdrawing state from the Union.
Furthermore, it provides that the withdrawal agreement and the arrangements for future agreement are to be concluded within two year time period, unless the Member States unanimously agree to extend the negotiating period.
Consequently, if the negotiations between the EU and the UK are successful in determining the conditions for withdrawing and the content of the new relationship, the date of the UK's withdrawal would then be the date of entry into force of the withdrawal treaty. If the UK and EU fail to agree on the conditions of the withdrawal, it is presumed that the withdrawal will automatically happen two years after the notification of the UK's Brexit decision to the European Council, 35 unless there is a unanimous decision to extend the negotiations. This would have the effect that the UK will not have a place or representation at the EU institutions anymore, and also, importantly, that there is no special legal cooperation between the UK and the EU beyond what is provided in the WTO framework.
Against these conditions, it is possible that the UK and the EU will conclude a series of agreements.
The first agreement on exit and after that they will seek another agreement on the new relationship.
In order to ensure that there is no gap between the two, it is also possible to agree on a transitional agreement to tie in these two periods together. Against this background the negotiation of the special kind of Treaty on the new relationship together with the withdrawal Treaty seems to be unrealistic given the schedule of two years, in a situation where it is becoming clear is that the negotiations are going to include at least two different permanent
Treaties: a withdrawal Treaty, which will sever the institutional link between the EU and the UK and set out the implications for the withdrawal, and separately the new agreement on the future relationship agreement between the EU and the UK. It normally takes years to negotiate trade treaties, for example, the CETA between the EU and Canada was launched in 2009, and it has only been finally signed for ratification in October 2016, 38 it is expected that the new UK -EU relationship may take longer than the two years set for the exit.
All this might at least in principle necessitate a third Treaty, which will include transitional arrangements for trade access, while the details of the new relationship are being negotiated. 39 It is understood that the latter will take place only if there is a good prospect for a new EU -UK relationship, and this prospect aims to create a more complex framework of cooperation than something that can be provided by an existing trade or internal market agreement structure, which could be taken directly off-the-shelf, even if it is unlikely that this could be done (more on that below). to have some form of institutional relationship with the EU. The obvious models here are the EEA Agreement and the Swiss arrangements and even possibly the Overseas Countries and Territories regime which is applicable between those territories of the Member States which do not belong to the EU and the EU. 44 The latter leads to the specific case of what if there could be a diversified alternative where different constituent parts of the UK have different EU relationship.
'Hard Brexit' = "Clean Brexit"?
The first and hardest option would be falling into the WTO arrangements. This essentially means that there will be no separate trade arrangement between the UK and EU. This can rather be described as a nuclear option, which may become as a result of a complete breakdown of the upcoming UK -EU negotiations, or if there is a failure to reach an agreement in the UK on the negotiation priorities. The EU, as well as the UK, are at least currently preparing for negotiations and a new relationship.
On the other end from the WTO option is a CETA-type of model, which refers to the freshly as this option is not without considerable difficulties either. It is still a 'hard Brexit', even though the Government does not wish to see it as such and rather prefers to call it clean Brexit instead. This type of FTA does not allow internal market type of access for the UK individuals or businesses, in particular as it does not abolish fully the trade barriers. This would re-erect barriers to where they do not exist, even in less controversial areas, and it does not include many of the other sectors that are included in the internal market, which might be desirable if not for the whole UK, at least parts of it, such as Scotland and Northern-Ireland. Finally, it might not be very easy to get a favourable trade agreement purely on sectoral issues from the EU partners either. This could politically be seen as 'cherry-picking' where the result would suit the needs of the UK, but not the EU.
'Soft Brexit'
As stated above, the EEA and Swiss arrangements lay the basis for the 'soft Brexit.' It is possible to say off the cuff that it is very unlikely that the Swiss arrangements will be repeated. With around 200 separate and interlinked agreements, the arrangement is too complicated to apply in practice and therefore not a desirable result. The EU is currently already trying to negotiate with Switzerland further clarity on the current arrangements of numerous sectoral bilateral agreements.
Therefore, what remains is in this category is an EEA type of agreement granting access to internal market. The objective of the EEA Agreement is to promote trade and economic relations between the contracting parties by setting a European Economic Area based on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital and equal conditions for competition. 46 In itself, the EAA-option seems improbable, since Norway has already announced that it is not willing to have the UK in the EFTA and EEA arrangement. Additionally, already the former PM Cameron excluded the EEA-option in 2015 and PM May has excluded it now again, although such an option would have had the advantage of simplicity. 47 The ultimate reason why it may be excluded is that this would result in a considerable reduction in the current relationship. The EEA countries participate in a large part of the EU's internal market and enjoy the four freedoms, but they are not committed to other EU policies, such as agriculture, fisheries, foreign policy or judicial affairs, nor in the customs union which may prove a crucial issue for retaining the open border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
If an internal market access will be deemed still desirable by the UK, it looks like the UK and EU will be building a special relationship. However, for that to be available, one of the most difficult question, the free movement of persons, needs to be solved. This may need political concessions from possibly both sides of the claims that the UK gets away with 'cherry-picking' on its relationship. Therefore, it is likely that the agreement would contain a punishment where the parties do not agree on the direction of the future regulation. However, the new institutional relationship, and the potential consequences for divergent approaches adopted by the EU and the UK raise much wider questions which fall outside the scope of this article.
Modelling after Overseas Countries and Territories: Reversed Greenland
One option that would take into account the regional preferences, which Piris did not mention in his list, is the so called reversed Greenland-option. Sarmiento has described this option in his blog article "Brexit or the art of doing a Greenland" as follows:
Greenland, although a part of Denmark with a special constitutional status, stopped being a territory of the European Communities in 1985. In fact, the trick was to change its status from an outermost region under Danish jurisdiction into an overseas territory. As is known, the EU Treaties allow some States with close ties with EU Member States, as well as some territories of EU Member States, to stand outside the territorial scope of application of the Treaties, but holding a special association status with the EU that grants them special rights of access to the internal market. These are the so-called Overseas Countries and Terriotories".
One of the trickiest challenges the UK will face in the following years is how to handle Brexit and keep the country together. Scotland and Gibraltar voted overwhelmingly in favour of remaining in the EU, whilst Northern Ireland delivered a firm remain vote as well. Making Brexit come true and keeping Britain in one piece will be no easy task. That is exactly why "doing a Greenland" would be the UK's best choice.
The United Kingdom could still be a member of the EU, but only after England and Wales withdraw from the territory of the EU, leaving Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar as "territories of the EU".
England and Wales would no longer be a part of the EU, but the Treaties could be modestly reformed, as they recently were for Mayotte, in order to embrace both regions as "overseas territories", with total autonomy and freedom to do their own business and act accordingly. In fact, the Treaties could be minimally reformed to grant England and Wales a special status among the overseas countries and territories, being that the subject of upcoming negotiations with the EU."
48
Sarmiento's idea is fascinating and it has been gaining traction both in the Scottish establishment and in other blogs. It would embrace the basic idea of devolution and the outcome of the Brexit referendum in various areas of the UK.
However, there are many obstacles for the Greenland model to be adopted. First, on basis of the UK constitutional system, the Greenland model might turn out to be politically unrealistic. Even though the UK consists of diverse nations already, it would be unforeseeable that the UK's participation in an organization of such an importance as the EU would be lead from Edinburgh and not from London or Westminster. The leading national unit would be comparatively small, with population of only 5 million inhabitants. It can be asked whether it would be acceptable for a state size of the UK to have the same voting power as Finland, which would be comparable in size to Scotland. Furthermore, the EU and some Member States in particular might fear the idea of separating the large EU countries to areas like that. Finally, it would increase the contemporary confusion in EU politics and it would again be open to 'cherry-picking' claims.
Conclusions
On basis of the issues outlined in the article it is practically impossible to comment precisely or predict with any accuracy what will be the influence of Brexit on the unwritten constitution of the 48 See https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com.
UK, to the relationship between the UK and the EU or to the cross-border trading and other relationships between the third countries and the UK. The first issue is that one cannot predict the influence of the Brexit decision to the constitutional landscape or procedures. In particular, the key question seems to have arisen in relation to the use of executive powers over Parliamentary sovereignty. The actions of the UK institutions, Government, Parliament and courts, will determine the separation of powers and the institutional relationships in this new era.
The second issue that arises is the framework for the future relationship between the UK and the EU at the current stage. Of course, it is true to say that nothing changes as long as the UK remains to be an EU Member State and the UK cannot formally open any negotiations with the EU before the withdrawal notification from the EU. However, once the UK internal constitutional hurdles have been overcome, it can proceed with the notification to withdraw from the EU.
Furthermore, at the moment the shape of the new relationship remains unclear. As analysed, there is no obvious solution available despite the recently published PM May's negotiation plan, the Government's White paper and the emphasis on "hard Brexit". Both 'hard Brexit' and 'soft Brexit', and the 'reversed Greenland' simply lead to further question marks, which will need to be solved both by the UK and the remaining EU states by analysing what the both sides want out of the new relationship. That leads to the final conclusion that unless the will to negotiate the new relationship vanishes totally from the UK or EU side, we are going to be seeing negotiations for years to come.
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